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arose under a common nucleus of fact, the district court could exercise its
power to adjudicate all the claims before it." That Omaha Power had been
dismissed from the suit prior to trial did not require dismissal of Mrs.
Kroger's claim against Owen Equipment, since Omaha Power's dismissal
was just one factor to be considered in determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction over the claim."'
The decision in Kroger is a sound one, and this case presents an opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule on the question whether a plaintiff
should be allowed to assert a claim against a nondiverse third-party defendant absent independent grounds of federal jurisdiction. Although the
Court has indicated a policy of limiting the power of the federal courts to
exercise jurisdiction," any question as to the propriety of the Kroger decision should be resolved in favor of the trial court's exercise of discretion.
A flexible discretionary test involving an ad-hoc balancing of the various
conflicting considerations is the ideal mechanism for promoting economy,
efficiency, and fairness to the parties while at the same time not overstepping the limits of the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Mike Davis
JUDGMENTS - Form and Substance - Attorney's
Approval of Faulty Order for Summary Judgment
Construed as an Order Entered by Agreement
Ho len v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
551 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. 1977).
Two minor passengers injured in a one-car accident involving an uninsured driver brought suit, individually and through their parents as next
friends, against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, seeking recovery under the "uninsured motorist" provision contained in their
70. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
71. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 405 (1970); Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 608 (1926); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 541 F.2d 226, 227 (9th'
Cir. 1976); A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Prods. Corp., 268 F. Supp. 289, 292-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
(will retain jurisdiction to prevent waste of time, effort, and expense), af V, 389 F.2d 11 (2d
Cir. 1968); cf. Pipeliners Local 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974) (retaining
jurisdiction over a counterclaim under rule 13(a) after main claim dismissed). But see
Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 895 (4th Cir. 1972).
72. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (refusing to allow
aggregation of claims to reach jurisdictional amount). See also Osbahr v. H. & M. Const.,
Inc., 407 F. Supp. 621, 623 (N.D. Iowa 1975) (Zahn precludes application of pendent party
or ancillary jurisdiction to claims below jurisdictional amount); Freeman v. Gordon &
Breach, Science Publishers, Inc., 398 F. Supp. 519, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Zahn precludes
application of pendent party or ancillary jurisdiction to claims below jurisdictional amount).
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parents' policies. State Farm filed a cross-action against the minor driver
and his father, Arthur Hollen. The plaintiffs then amended their petition
to include both the driver and his father in the suit. Arthur Hollen moved
for summary judgment. The motion included the plaintiffs in the style of
the case, but the body of the motion and the prayer requested only that
third party plaintiff State Farm take nothing against the defendant. The
trial court granted the motion after hearing arguments of counsel for both
State Farm and Hollen and after reviewing the evidence presented. The
court then requested that Hollen's attorney prepare the appropriate order.
The judge entered an "Order Sustaining Defendant and Cross-Defendant
Arthur Hollen's Motion for Summary Judgment and Severance,"' but not
before the plaintiffs' attorney had given Hollen's attorney permission to
sign his name to the order, approving it as to substance and form.2 The
summary judgment was rendered against both State Farm and the plaintiffs. On appeal by State Farm, the court of civil appeals reversed, finding
that a material question of fact existed which precluded the granting of a
summary judgment.' Hollen appealed the decision, contending that the
summary judgment rendered against the plaintiffs had become final due
to their failure to appeal, thereby destroying the subrogation rights of State
Farm.' Held-Reversed. When counsel for a party not mentioned in a
motion for summary judgment approves the order for summary judgment
as to substance and form, it will be construed as an order entered by
agreement as to that party, rather than a summary judgment.5
Generally, summary judgment may be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits reveal no genuine issue which would require a trial on
the merits.' Absent a motion, however, neither a trial court nor an appellate court may render a summary judgment.' In Bell v. TA CA, Inc.,' one
1. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex. 1977). The title of

the order, as well as the body, indicates that both claims against Hollen were severed and
dismissed. Id. at 48.

2. Id. at 48-49.

3. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hollen, 543 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976), rev'd, 551 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. 1977).

4. The insurer's right of subrogation is derived from the rights of the insured, and is

limited to those rights; where the insured has no cause of action against the defendant, there
can be no subrogation. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex.

1977); McBroome-Bennett Plumbing, Inc. v. Villa France Inc., 515 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tex. Civ.

App.-Dallas 1974, writ rerd n.r.e.); Sheppard v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 496
S.W.2d 216, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, no writ); see Tax. R. Civ. P.

38.

5. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. 1977).
6. Tax. R. Civ. P. 166A; e.g., Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.
1970); Smith v. Ortman-McCain Co., 537 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); PHB, Inc. v. Goldsmith, 534 S.W.2d 196, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th

Dist.]), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 539 S.W.2d 60 (Tex. 1976).

7. E.g., Hinojosa v. Edgerton, 447 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. 1969); Republic Nat'l. Bank

v. Southern Brokerage Co., 338 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd
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of two defendants moved for summary judgment, yet the court granted
summary judgments for both defendants. The Eastland Court of Civil
Appeals held that the trial court was without authority to render a judgment in favor of the nonmoving defendant since the plaintiff had never
been called to defend such a motion.'
An agreed judgment,10 on the other hand, is an agreement made by the
parties to the dispute and entered upon the record with the approval and
sanction of the court." To become a binding judgment, the agreement
must conform to certain guidelines.'" First, the judgment is in the nature
of a contract since the parties involved, not the court, determine its provisions. 3 The general rules of contract interpretation are therefore applicable.1 ' No rule of contract interpretation is more firmly established than the
rule which gives effect to the parties' own interpretation of a contract of
uncertain meaning. 5
Second, to be enforceable, the agreement must comply with rule 11,
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that it be in writing, signed,
and filed as part of the record, or made in open court and entered of
record." The court has no power to render a judgment until all the terms
n.r.e.); Durham v. I.C.T. Ins. Co., 283 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
dism'd); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 166A(c).
8. 493 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ).
9. Id.
10. The words "agreed judgment," "consent decree," and "consent judgment" will be
used interchangeably throughout this paper. See 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE §
17.21 (1971).
11. E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 323 F.2d 412, 416 (7th
Cir. 1963); Layton v. Layton, 139 S.E.2d 732, 735 (N.C. 1965); Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex.
313, 317, 123 S.W.2d 871, 872 (1939); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
12. See, e.g., Vickrey v. American Youth Camps, Inc., 532 S.W.2d 292, 292 (Tex. 1976);
Stewart v. Mathes, 528 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ); Farr v.
McKinzie, 477 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See generally Note, The Consent Judgment as an Instrument of Compromise and
Settlement, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1314 (1959).
13. E.g., Yount v. Lowe, 215 S.E.2d 563, 567 (N.C. 1975); Threet v. Texas Employers'
Ins. Ass'n., 516 S.W.2d 276, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ); McClain v. Hickey,
418 S.W.2d 588,. 590 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Coca-Cola
Co. v. Standard Bottling Co., 138 F.2d 788, 789 (10th Cir. 1943).
14. E.g., Edwards v. Gifford, 137 Tex. 559, 563, 155 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1941); Threet v.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n., 516 S.W.2d 276, 277 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ);
DeLee v. Allied Fin. Co., 408 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1966, no writ). Consent
decrees are to be read within their four corners since they represent the agreement of the
parties, rather than an independent examination by the court. Hart Schaffner & Marx v.
Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 101, 102 (2d Cir. 1965).
15. E.g., Richards v. Bycroft, 249 N.W.2d 743, 745 (Neb. 1977); United Founders Life
Ins. Co. v. Carey, 363 S.W.2d 236, 243 (Tex. 1962); Threet v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n.,
516 S.W.2d 276, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ).
16. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 11.
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of the agreement have been settled and reduced to writing or placed in the
record."'
The most essential element of an agreed judgment, however, is consent."
The power of the court to render judgment depends upon the consent of
the parties, not at the time of the agreement, but at the time judgment is
rendered, for a party may withdraw his consent at any time prior to the
rendition."9 When rendered, the judgment must be in strict, literal compliance with-the parties' agreement." The court may not add to, delete from,
or modify the terms, as the rendering of an agreed judgment is purely a
ministerial function.2 ' Once an agreed judgment is entered it generally may
not be appealed, except on grounds of fraud, collusion, lack of jurisdiction,
or mutual mistake.

22

While an authorized attorney may consent to a judgment on behalf of
his client,23 the authorities are in conflict as to whether an agreed judgment
17. E.g., Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 319, 123 S.W.2d 871, 873 (1939); Carter v.
Carter, 535 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Owen v. Finigan,
381 S.W.2d 578, 579 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see TEX. R. Civ. P.
11; 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.22 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Edwards v. Gifford, 137 Tex. 559, 563,155 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1941); Farr v.
McKinzie, 477 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref d
n.r.e.); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
19. E.g., Cranford v. Steed, 151 S.E.2d 206, 208 (N.C. 1966) (judgment void if consent
does not exist when court approves agreement and promulgates it as judgment); Burnaman
v. Heaton, 150 Tex. 333, 338, 240 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1951) (that party's consent existed at one
time insufficient to support consent judgment, since consent must exist at very moment court
undertakes to make agreement into judgment); Farr v. McKinzie, 477 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (valid consent judgment cannot be
rendered by trial court when consent of one party is lacking).
20. E.g., Edwards v. Gifford, 137 Tex. 559, 563, 155 S.W.2d 786, 788 (1941); Farr v.
McKinzie, 477 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston (14th Dist.] 1972, writ refd
n.r.e.); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
refd n.r.e.).
21. Matthews v. Looney, 132 Tex. 313, 317, 123 S.W.2d 871, 872 (1939); W.L. Moody &
Co. v. Yarbrough, 510 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 285 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
22. E.g., Gravel v. Alaskan Village, Inc., 409 P.2d 983, 986 (Alaska 1966) (consent judgment not subject to appellate review, except in cases of fraud, mutual mistake, collusion, or
lack of jurisdiction); Cofield v. Sanders, 451 P.2d 320, 322 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (agreed
judgment not subject to appellate review except on grounds of fraud, mutual mistake, collusion, lack of jurisdiction, or lack of consent); Alexander v. Alexander, 373 S.W.2d 800, 805
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1963, no writ) (agreed judgments governed by laws relating
to contracts, rather than laws relating to judgments); see Rocks v. Brosius, 217 A.2d 531, 541
(Md. 1966) (appeal will not lie in consent decree); cf. Trupski v. Kanar, 115 N.W.2d 408, 410
(Mich. 1962) (order denying motion to dismiss not subject to appellate review, since defendant consented to it both as to substance and form). But cf. Hall v. McKee, 179 S.W.2d 590,
592 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1944, no writ) (consent judgment by justice court may be
appealed to county court for trial de novo).
23. E.g., Cranford v. Cranford, 158 S.E.2d 246, 247 (Ga. 1967) (order entered with con-
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exists when the attorneys have approved and signed the draft for judgment." Some courts have held that such approval does indeed constitute
an agreed order.2 5 The greater weight of authority, however, supports the
view that a notation of approval, followed by counsel's signature, does not
in and of itself constitute an agreed judgment." Instead, these cases have
held that such approval has no significance other than to indicate that the
proposed draft truly evinces the judgment rendered by the court, and not
that the judgment is agreed. 7
In Holien v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 8 the court
found the judgment rendered was an agreed judgment, notwithstanding
the fact that it was styled "summary judgment" and had been considered
as such by the lower courts and the parties throughout the litigation. To
reach its determination, the court followed the principle that it must look
beyond the title of the order to determine its true nature.2 State Farm's
concern on appeal was whether the plaintiffs' failure to appeal the sumsent of counsel is binding on client absent fraud, accident, mistake, or collusion of counsel);
Commonwealth v. Rozman, 309 A.2d 197, 200 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973) (attorney has authority
to enter consent decree with the client's direction, knowledge, or consent); Noska v. Mills,
141 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1940, no writ) (attorney of record authorized to
bind client by agreement so long as agreement does not surrender client's rights).
24. Compare Kirn v. Ioor, 253 N.W. 318, 319 (Mich. 1934) with Chicago & Vicinity
Hungarian Benevolent Soc'y v. Chicago & Suburb Hungarian Aid Soc'y, 118 N.E. 1012, 1014
(Ill. 1918).
25. See Chicago & Vicinity Hungarian Benevolent Soc'y. v. Chicago & Suburb Hungarian Aid Soc'y., 118 N.E. 1012, 1014 (Il. 1918) (consent decree found where, before entry,
decree prepared by master in chancery was approved by "OK" and signatures of counsel);
Kelly v. Winkler, 114 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ill. App. Ct. 1953) (counsel's "OK" construed as being
his unqualified approval, thereby making it a consent order); accord, Trupski v. Kanar, 115
N.W.2d 408, 410 (Mich. 1962) (order not subject to appellate review since approved as to
substance and form by defendant). But see Sampson v. Village of Stickney, 180 N.E.2d 457,
459 (I1. 1962) (approval cannot ipso facto be construed as acquiescence to substance of
decree); Kirn v. loor, 235 N.W. 318, 319 (Mich. 1934) (order approved as to "substance and
form" was not order entered by agreement).
26. See, e.g., Sampson v. Village of Stickney, 180 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ill. 1962) ("approved"
or "approved as to form"); Faust v. Louisville Trust Co., 232 S.W. 58, 59 (Ky. 1921) ("OK");
McRary v. McRary, 47 S.E.2d 27, 31 (N.C. 1948) ("OK"); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co., 186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, writ refd w.o.m.) (signature of
counsel on draft indicated approval of proposed form); Bank of Gauley v. Osenton, 114 S.E.
435, 437 (W. Va. 1922) ("OK").
27. E.g., James C. Wilborn & Sons, Inc. v. Heniff, 205 N.E.2d 771, 774 (I1. App. Ct.
1965); Faust v. Louisville Trust Co., 232 S.W. 58, 59 (Ky. 1921); Gillespie v. Martin, 109
S.W.2d 93, 94 (Tenn. 1937).
28. 551 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. 1977).
29. Id. at 49. The motion, which included the plaintiffs in its caption, but not in the
body, did not apply to the plaintiffs since a motion's substance is riot to be determined by
its caption, but is to be gleaned from the body of the instrument and its prayer for relief.
Mercer v. Band, 454 S.W.2d 833, 835-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, no
writ); see Rubenstein v. United States, 227 F.2d 638, 642 (10th Cir. 1955); Ramirez v. Flores,
505 S.W.2d 406, 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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mary judgment had destroyed its subrogation rights, as contended by the
petitioner. State Farm maintained that there could not be a final judgment
against the plaintiffs since no motion for summary judgment had been
filed.3 0The Texas Supreme Court, however, held that the rules pertaining
to summary judgments were not applicable since the signature of the
plaintiffs' attorney approving the order as to substance and form created
an agreed judgment.3
An entirely different construction was placed on the notation "approved
as to substance and form" by the Supreme Court of Michigan in Kirn v.
Ioo r.1 In that case, the court refused to find an agreed judgment, holding
instead that the indorsement by the losing party's attorney merely acknowledged that the proposed decree was legally formulated and contained
in substance the decision as orally announced by the court.3 By looking
to the attending circumstances behind the judgment, the court found no
evidence of preliminary discussion or negotiation between the attorneys to
compromise or surrender the rights of either party. Similarly, an examination of the surrounding circumstances in Hollen revealed no evidence of
contract negotiations.3 The Texas Supreme Court based its finding solely
upon the notation itself and the plaintiffs' failure to appeal the summary
judgment. By failing to appeal, the court reasoned, the plaintiffs thereby
acknowledged the existence of an agreed judgment."
30. See, e.g., Hinojosa v. Edgerton, 447 S.W.2d 670, 673 (Tex. 1969); Republic Nat'l
Bank v. Southern Brokerage Co., 338 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Durham v. I.C.T. Ins. Co., 283 S.W.2d 413, 415 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1955, writ .dism'd).
31. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. 1977). The court
did not address the requirements of an agreed judgment, but held that from the order itself
there appeared to be an order entered by agreement. Id. at 49.
32. 253 N.W. 318 (Mich, 1934).
33. Id. at 319.
34. Id. at 319; cf. Leupe v. Leupe, 130 P.2d 697, 700 (Cal. 1942) (property settlement
not agreement by consent since none of terms of proposed settlement were disclosed and it
did not appear whether agreement was actually concluded or whether terms of decree were
in accordance with terms of proposed settlement).
35. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hollen, 543 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1976), rev'd, 551 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. 1977). In the court of civil
appeals, both State Farm and Hollen conceded that a summary judgment had been rendered
against the plaintiffs by the trial court. Their concern on appeal was whether the summary
judgment destroyed State Farm's subrogation rights. Neither party contended that an agreement had been made between them. Id. at 180. The validity of the summary judgment was
not questioned until the oral arguments before the Texas Supreme Court. When State Farm
attacked the judgment because of failure to file a motion for summary judgment, again
neither party mentioned an agreement between them. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 551 S.W. 2d 46, 49 (Tex. 1977).
36. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. 1977); cf. Gravel
v. Alaskan Village, Inc., 409 P.2d 983, 986 (Alaska 1966) (consent judgments are not generally
appealable); Rocks v. Brosius, 217 A.2d 531, 541 (Md. 1966) (appeal will not lie in a consent

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol9/iss3/15

6

Randall: Attorney's Approval of Faulty Order for Summary Judgment Construe

19781

CASE NOTES

The judgment against the plaintiffs in the trial court does not appear to
have been based on the independent agreement of the parties, however, in
light of the common procedure followed by the courts in entering an order
into judgment. After the court announces its decision, it usually directs the

prevailing party to prepare a draft of the order. The draft is prepared and
submitted to the opposing party to determine whether it conforms with the
announced decision, approved by that attorney, and then submitted to the

court.37 In accordance with this practice, the trial court in Hollen determined that a motion should be granted and directed Hollen's attorney to
prepare the order.38 Since a hearing on the merits of a summary judgment
had occurred, and a judicial determination had been made, the supreme
court's finding appears to refute the established requirements of an agreed
judgment." By definition, an agreed judgment must conform with the
contract voluntarily entered into by the parties and does not require proof
on the merits.' 0 A hearing before the court and a judicial determination of
the rights of the parties, followed by the attorneys' approval of the order,
does not represent an independent agreement by the parties, but instead
reflects the decision of the court."
Nevertheless, the order in Hollen was explicitly approved as to
substance,'" whereas in most instances the notation indicates approval
only of form. 3 While the plaintiffs' attorney signed the order as to substance and form, the attorney for State Farm was requested to approve the
order as to form only." Furthermore, had the plaintiffs' attorney read the
order before it was entered, it should have been apparent to him that the
court was also dismissing his clients' cause of action.'" The word
"approved" imports the exercise of judgment and discretion,'" and the
decree); Alexander v. Alexander, 373 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1963,
no writ) (agreed judgments are governed by the laws relating to contracts).
37. E.g., Sampson v. Village of Stickney, 180 N.E.2d 457, 459 (I1. 1962); Bank of Gauley
v. Osenton, 114 S.E. 435, 437 (W. Va. 1922); see State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co.,
186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref d w.o.m.).
38. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex. 1977).
39. See Nelson v. Nelson, 92 N.E.2d 534, 535 (Ill. App. Ct. 1950); Harter v. King County,
119 P.2d 919, 923 (Wash. 1941).
40. Harter v. King County, 119 P.2d 919, 923 (Wash. 1941); see Matthews v. Looney,
132 Tex. 313, 319, 123 S.W.2d 871, 873 (1939); 4 R. McDONALD, TEXAS CIvILPRACTIC § 17.22
(1971).
41. People v. Hunter, 111 N.E.2d 906, 907 (Il1. App. Ct. 1953); Nelson v. Nelson, 92
N.E.2d 534, 535 (Il. App. Ct. 1950); McRary v. McRary, 47 S.E.2d 27, 31 (N.C. 1948).
42. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex. 1977).
43. See James C. Wilborn & Sons, Inc. v. Heniff, 205 N.E.2d 771, 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965);
Gillespie v. Martin, 109 S.W.2d 93, 94 (Tenn. 1937); State v. Reagan County Purchasing Co.,
186 S.W.2d 128, 136 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
44. Hollen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tex. 1977).
45. The title of the order, as well as the body, expressly stated that the actions against
Arthur Hollen, both as defendant and cross-defendant, be severed and dismissed. d. at 48.
46. Nelson v. Nelson, 92 N.E.2d 534, 536 (Il1.App. Ct. 1950) (dissenting opinion).
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court had the right to assume that the attorney utilized both in approving
the order.
While the Texas Supreme Court has adopted the view that approval as
to substance and form constitutes an agreed judgment, a further difficulty
remains in the Hollen decision in that the plaintiffs were minors. To determine whether an agreed judgment should be entered, the court should first
determine whether the parties are capable of binding themselves by consent and whether they have in fact done so.47 Since a minor is in a sense a
ward of the court when party to a suit, the court should require satisfactory
proof before entering a decree against him." Furthermore, an attorney may
not waive any substantial rights of a minor or consent to anything which
may be prejudicial to him. 9 While a minor's next friend or authorized
attorney may agree to judgments when approved by the court,5 it appears
no inquiry was made in Ho len into the authority of the attorney or the
wisdom of allowing him to consent to an order which destroyed the minors'
cause of action.'
As a result of the Hollen decision, the announced rule in Texas is that
the notation, "approved as to substance and form," shall be interpreted
as acquiescence by the losing party to the terms set forth in the order,
rather than as recognition that the judgment entered is in substance the
one announced by the court. The fact that the parties add their consent
to an order should not be allowed to convert it into an agreed order, however formally such consent or approval is made. 2 If the order does not
evince an agreement of the parties, the mere fact that the order is approved
and endorsed by the attorney should not operate to waive the fundamental
requirements of an agreed judgment.53 An adverse judgment by agreement
47. Risk v. Director of Ins., 3 N.W.2d 922, 926 (Neb. 1942). See generally James, Consent
Judgments As Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PENN. L. Rv. 173, 179 (1959).
48. Dial v. Martin, 37 S.W.2d 166, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1931), rev'd on other
grounds, 57 S.W.2d 75, 85 (Tex. 1933).
49. See Lowery v. Berry, 153 Tex. 411, 414, 269 S.W.2d 795, 797 (1954). See generally 43
C.J.S. Infants § 114b (1947).
50. TEX. R. Civ. P. 44(2).
51. The Texas Supreme Court did not address itself to the issue of authorization of the
attorney and, of course, the trial court did not inquire into the minors' rights, since it was
not determined until the supreme court review that an agreement had been made. See Hollen
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 551 S.W.2d 46, 49 (Tex. 1977).
52. Leupe v. Leupe, 130 P.2d 697, 700 (Cal. 1942) ("approved" followed by signature of
attorney does not transform decree into contractual agreement); Faust v. Louisville Trust
Co., 232 S.W. 58, 59 (Ky. 1921); McRary v. McRary, 47 S.E.2d 27, 31 (N.C. 1948) (decree
entered by court upon consideration of pleadings and evidence is a judgment of the court:
that parties have superadded their consent does not convert decree into judgment by consent
however formally consent or approval may be made); see 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 173 (1947).
53. Faust v. Louisville Trust Co., 232 S.W. 58, 59 (Ky. 1921) (approval of counsel no
more than notation that order was drawn in accordance with court's opinion and has none of
the attributes of agreed judgment); McRary v. McRary, 47 S.E.2d 27, 31 (N.C. 1948) (ap-
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